Hutto and Myin claim that teleosemantics cannot account for mental content. In their view, teleosemantics accounts for a poorer kind of relation between cognitive states and the world but lacks the theoretical tools to account for a richer kind. We show that their objection imposes two criteria on theories of content: a truth-evaluable criterion and an intensionality criterion. For the objection to go through, teleosemantics must be subject to both these criteria and must fail to satisfy them. We argue that (...) teleosemantics meets the truth-evaluable criterion and is not required to meet the intensionality criterion. We conclude that Hutto and Myin’s objection fails. (shrink)

Since Hume, there has been broad consensus that if the notion of the good has any intelligible foundation, it is not “ontological”, in the natures of things. Today however this view is being challenged. After a sketch of the positions of Kant and Hume, and a glance at some of the recent challenges, the paper examines a key element in Thomas Aquinas’s ontol- ogy of the good: the notion of nal causality. For Thomas nal causality presupposes formal and e cient (...) causality. Hume’s denial of the intelligibility of the good, it is su ested, presup- poses his denial of that of these other causes. (shrink)

Stephen Davies taught philosophy at the University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand. His research specialty is the philosophy of art. He is a former President of the American Society for Aesthetics. His books include Definitions of Art (Cornell UP, 1991), Musical Meaning and Expression (Cornell UP, 1994), Musical Works and Performances (Clarendon, 2001), Themes in the Philosophy of Music (OUP, 2003), Philosophical Perspectives on Art (OUP, 2007), Musical Understandings and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Music (OUP, 2011), The (...) Artful Species: Aesthetics, Art, and Evolution (OUP, 2012), The Philosophy of Art (Wiley-Blackwell, 2016 second ed.), and Adornment: What Self-decorations Tells Us about Who We Are, (Bloomsbury Academic, 2020). (shrink)

I defend the claim that understanding is the goal of explanation against various persistent criticisms, especially the criticism that understanding is not truth-connected in the appropriate way, and hence is a merely psychological state. Part of the reason why understanding has been dismissed as the goal of explanation, I suggest, is because the psychological dimension of the goal of explanation has itself been almost entirely neglected. In turn, the psychological dimension of understanding—the Aha! experience, the sense that a certain explanation (...) “feels right”, and so on—has been conspicuously overemphasized. I try to correct for both of these exaggerations. Just as the goal of explanation includes a richer psychological—including phenomenological—dimension than is generally acknowledged, so too understanding has a stronger truth connection than is generally acknowledged.Keywords: Understanding; Explanation; Philosophy of science; Epistemology. (shrink)

This work is an examination of the metaphysical presuppositions involved in the science of organic form. Taking the dichotomy of structuralism versus functionalism in nineteenth century biology as the central subject of my study, I explore a network of unquestioned premises and isolate areas where empirical research programs and underlying metaphysical commitments both inform and hinder each other. ;I begin with the Cuvier-Geoffroy debate of 1830--a debate that clearly articulates the tensions between structuralist and functionalist approaches to organic form. On (...) the side of functionalism, I am led to confront the rich concept of teleological causality. The concept of teleology, frequently taken to be semantically univocal, in fact unfolds into a cluster of related notions. I begin to demarcate significant differences between "intentional," "heuristic," "cosmic," and "organismic" teleology. On the side of structuralism, I set out to unearth the presuppositions of materialist versus idealist conceptions of structure--showing where naturalists have been both liberated and enslaved by their respective metaphysical commitments. With the basic divisions between structuralist and functionalist drawn, I set out to trace the dichotomy through the paradigm shift from fixism to transformism. ;In Darwin's system the structural/functional tensions become synthesized into complementary principles of causality. Here I explore the underlying presuppositional shifts which enabled Darwin to harmonize the previously intractable oppositions. These shifts include: rethinking teleology without "design," rethinking the archetype as real progenitor, and adopting a pluralistic perspective regarding causal mechanisms. ;The relative success of Darwin's appropriation of structuralism and functionalism leads to a discussion of the dichotomous character of the central subject itself. I argue that at the root of the dichotomous characterization of structure and function lies an impoverished understanding of teleology. I then offer "organicist" teleology as a powerful alternative to the French-Anglo tradition of "intentional" teleology. Presupposing the alternative teleology forms a challenge to the way in which French-Anglo naturalists have understood structural and functional relations. Together with Darwin's causal pluralism, a richer notion of teleology provides a different set of metaphysical assumptions and leads to an alternative model for empirical research programs. (shrink)

Essence and causation are fundamental in metaphysics, but little is said about their relations. Some essential properties are of course causal, as it is essential to footprints to have been caused by feet. But I am interested less in causation's role in essence than the reverse: the bearing a thing's essence has on its causal powers. That essencemight make a causal contribution is hinted already by the counterfactual element in causation; and the hint is confirmed by the explanation essence offers (...) of something otherwise mysterious, namely, how events exactly alike in every ordinary respect, like the bolt'ssuddenly snapping and its snapping per se, manage to disagree in what they cause. Some prior difference must exist between these events to make their causal powers unlike. Paradoxically, though, it can only be in point of a property, suddenness, which both events possess in common. Only by postulating a difference in themanner — essential or accidental — of the property's possession is the paradox resolved. Next we need an account of causation in which essence plays an explicit determinative role. That account, based on the idea that causes should becommensurate with their effects, is thatx causesy only if nothing essentially poorer would have done, and nothing essentially richer was needed. (shrink)

A collection of seminal articles in climate ethics and climate justice.

I argue that the dominant conception of normative reasons in moral philosophy works to exclude certain modes of valuing from fair representation in moral deliberation and justification. I then argue that while reasons are taken to be the center and focus of practical thought, there are a wide and familiar range of activities in everyday life whose full appreciation escapes meaningful formulation in terms of reasons. As a result, the significance of these activities is systematically discounted or ignored by the (...) dominant assumptions about what counts as a reason in the methodology of moral philosophy. I conclude by putting forward my own positive account of practical thinking called loving attention, which contributes to a richer understanding of the elements of practical thought in some familiar cases of valuing, moral concept acquisition, imagination, and attention. (shrink)

Radical forms of geoengineering, such as stratospheric sulfate injection (SSI), raise serious concerns about justice and the plight of the most vulnerable. However, these are sometimes dismissed on the basis of a challenge: “What if, in the face of catastrophic impacts, the most vulnerable countries initiate geoengineering themselves, or beg the richer, more technically sophisticated countries to do it? Wouldn’t geoengineering then be ethically permissible? Who could refuse them?” As a US tech billionaire put it, “Frankly, the Maldives could say, (...) ‘F--- you all—we want to stay alive’. Would you blame them? Wouldn’t any reasonable country do the same?” Such questions are intended to be rhetorical: it is assumed simply to be obvious that the appeals of the desperate would justify radical geoengineering. Moreover, the framing suggests that other nations would have strong moral reasons either to respect intervention by the desperate, or even to aid them by deploying themselves. Sometimes such arguments are also used to justify accelerating research on geoengineering now. If the desperate might attempt geoengineering, it is said, we should work out how best to do it, so as to assist them through advice. In general, the overriding thought is that the threat of catastrophe coupled with the plight of vulnerable populations provides most of the justification needed for the wider pursuit of a geoengineering agenda. Desperation becomes a trump card in the policy discourse. In this article, I argue that the desperation argument misses much of what is at stake, ethically speaking, in geoengineering policy. I focus on two further questions. The more obvious—the justificatory question—asks “under what conditions would geoengineering become justified?”, where the conditions to be considered would include, for example, the threat to be confronted, the governance mechanisms, the individual protections to be provided, the compensation provisions to be made, and so on. The less obvious question is the contextual question: “What is the ethical context within which geoengineering is likely to occur, and what difference does this make to our analysis of it?” (Gardiner 2013). In light of this distinction, I argue for two claims. First, on neither of the two most obvious interpretations of it does the desperation argument clearly justify the pursuit of geoengineering. Indeed, it may even count against such pursuit. Second, in any case, the context in which SSI is actually being pursued reveals more about the live threats and ethical import of geoengineering. For example, to push the most vulnerable to the point where they feel forced to accept pronounced subjugation to those who have made them desperate is a morally horrifying prospect which we have strong ethical reason to avoid. Such possibilities should not be concealed behind the superficial bravado of “f--- you all” and “what any reasonable country would do.” None of this implies that ethical geoengineering is impossible. However, it does suggest that geoengineering is morally complex in ways unappreciated by simple appeals to desperation. (shrink)